Bank Culture and the Official Sector:
A Spectrum of Options
Michael Held and Thomas M. Noone
Culture is a topic of growing interest in financial services. The
purpose of this Article is to explain why we—two lawyers at a central
bank—have paid attention. We also hope to prompt conversations with
academics, regulators, and bankers about how culture contributes to
decisions and behaviors in the financial services industry.
Culture, ethics, and behavior tend to be the professional pursuits of
anthropologists, philosophers, and psychologists—not lawyers or central
bankers. But, we are convinced that culture is a topic worthy of attention,
dialogue, and action in any profession, industry, or organization, including
financial services. Culture in financial services is especially important
because the decisions that bankers and other financial professionals make
affect others (all of us, really) in powerful ways.
It may sound obvious, or overly modest, to say that “culture matters.”
Five years ago, the prevailing reaction to a suggestion that regulators and
supervisors1 should pay attention to culture was, in essence, “seriously?”
This idea can still provoke skepticism. The word itself—culture—can
prompt visceral aversion or quick dismissal as a “somewhat contested
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1. The United States regulates many industries, but subjects banks and certain other financial
institutions to supervision as well. At the Federal Reserve,
[r]egulation entails establishing the rules within which financial institutions must operate—
in other words, issuing specific regulations and guidelines governing the formation,
operations, activities, and acquisitions of financial institutions. Once the rules and
regulations are established, supervision—which involves monitoring, inspecting, and
examining financial institutions—seeks to ensure that an institution complies with those
rules and regulations, and that it operates in a safe and sound manner.
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES &
FUNCTIONS 74 (10th ed. 2016).
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academic concept,” mired in theoretical or semantic disagreement,2 not
easily quantifiable and measurable as compared to, say, capital or
liquidity. It is too subjective or “squishy” to merit serious discussion.
If you think culture is too squishy, please hear us out. In Part I of this
Article, we set out what we mean by culture. In Part II, we explain why
we are interested in culture and why it matters to us now. In Part III, we
will survey the work of other public authorities in their efforts to address
culture. In our view, these efforts fall into several categories along a
spectrum from more advisory to more prescriptive. We do not endorse any
particular method. All of these efforts are useful attempts to address a
common problem: repeated ethical failures that undermine the
trustworthiness of financial services. We hope this Part will direct
interested academics to useful source material and demonstrate the value
of the various different approaches. In Part IV, we will focus on what the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the New York Fed) has done to
address culture. These efforts fall on the advisory end of the spectrum of
available tools covered in Part III. This reflects, in part, the New York
Fed’s role within the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United
States. Finally, in Part V, we pose a few questions for further discussion
in academic forums:
1. What are we missing about culture?
2. What else should we and our colleagues at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York do?
3. How do we know if there has been progress?
This Article does not include the customary survey of scholarly
literature; we leave that to the more academically focused. Our purpose is
not to fill gaps in what theorists and researchers have written. In addition,
we avoid stating how financial institutions have approached culture,
except where their efforts are public or described by other public
authorities. This approach avoids concerns about inadvertently disclosing
any confidential supervisory information.
I.
As we use the term, culture means the shared norms within a group
that are evidenced through behavior. There are four key concepts
embedded in this definition: (1) shared, (2) norms, (3) evidence, and (4)
behavior.
2. See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.
Conference: Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Good Compliance,
Not Mere Compliance (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo
20141020a.htm [https://perma.cc/3EYX-4GQX].
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First, culture must be shared. Culture concerns groups, not
individuals. Of course, we are all part of multiple groups within and apart
from where we work. This makes assessing and managing culture
difficult—that is the bad news. The good news, however, is that culture is
ordinary. Every group has a culture. We all know this from the many
groups of which we are a part—culture helps us fit in and get along. In our
view, groups that pay attention to their cultures will be more effective—
more successful in fulfilling their purposes—than groups that ignore their
cultures and tempt fate.
Second, norms are customs or habits followed by a group. Norms are
part of the human psyche. Each of us relies on group norms for mental
efficiency because we cannot possibly reason through every choice. We
look around us. We see what succeeds and what does not. And, hopefully,
we model our decisions and conduct on the former, not the latter. If a
person’s behavior violates a group norm, the group may impose some
informal discipline. Group norms are also gap-fillers and interpreters; they
pick up where rules leave off. After all, rules cannot address every scenario
and often require interpretive gloss. Group norms often supply that gloss.
Third, there must be evidence. We are suspicious of assessments or
diagnoses of culture based on intuition. Intuition is often judgment based
on incomplete and inadequate facts, unverified anecdotes, and secondhand
rumors. Once we gather evidence, we can begin to think about
commonalities, root causes, and their relationship to culture. Of course,
interpretations of facts may vary, but a commitment to observable
behavior supplies objectivity.
Finally, there is behavior. In our view, this is the best evidence of
culture. Behavior is a transmission mechanism for norms, or “how we do
things.” In looking at a group’s culture, we cannot just consider statements
of values—what some call “tone from the top.” Clear, simple principles
and statements of purpose have their uses. To understand culture, however,
we must observe what is done as well as what is said or written. Therefore,
in assessing a group’s culture, stated criteria for hiring, conduct, and
promotion matter less than actual choices about who is hired, who is fired,
and who is rewarded. It is critical to recognize that a group’s narrative may
differ radically from how members of the group actually behave.
An effective culture is one that enables an organization to fulfill its
purposes. Speaking at the New York Fed in 2016, the philosopher Onora
O’Neill urged the audience to consider the question: “What is banking
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for?”3 And, more specifically addressed to bankers in the audience: “What
is your bank for?”4
These questions require continuous attention. Some features of what
it means to be a bank are enduring, but others change. Last year, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency announced it would issue national bank
charters for non-depository “fintech” companies.5 More recently, the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority announced it granted banking licenses to
four companies that will operate “virtual banks.”6 Many well-established
financial institutions, meanwhile, promote themselves as “technology
companies.”7 If technology companies want to be banks, and banks want
to be technology companies, What does this tell us about the purpose of
banking?
Of course, many financial services firms comprise businesses
beyond banks, strictly speaking. That may make Baroness O’Neill’s
questions more difficult to answer, and perhaps more important. Whether
a bank is large or small, complex or simple, these questions require careful
thought. We will not attempt to answer them here. It is essential, moreover,
that banks answer these questions for themselves. Supervisors should not
supply the answers.
That said, supervisors can give suggestions. Over the years, the
Federal Reserve’s supervisory materials have pointed to a consistent set of
features that characterize an effective bank culture. These include
consumer protection, compliance with laws and regulations, and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest.8 A good culture promotes conduct that
an objective observer would consider ethical.9 It will also promote
3. Onora O’Neill, Baroness of Bengarve, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s
Conference: Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: What is Banking
For? 1 (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/governance-and-culturereform/ONeill-Culture-Workshop-Remarks-10202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/944D-MTCN].
4. Id.
5. News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Begins Accepting National
Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018), https://www.
occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma.cc/GW5R-24DT].
6. Press Release, H.K. Monetary Auth., Granting of Virtual Banking Licences (May 9, 2019),
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-information/press-releases/2019/20190509-3.shtml [https://perma
.cc/QVG5-RDUE].
7. See Matt Levine, It’s Getting Harder to Tell Banks from Tech Companies, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
14, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-15/lloyd-blankfein-wants-goldmansachs-to-push-technology [https://perma.cc/Y7DS-BYQZ]; see also JPMORGAN CHASE, INVESTING
IN OUR FUTURE 52 (2015), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document
/ar2015-lettertoshareholders.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MZW-QLKQ].
8. Letter from Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at
Each Reserve Bank and to Domestic and Foreign Large Fin. Insts. 5 (Dec. 17, 2012), https://www.
federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1217.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKC7-5ZJ8].
9. Letter from Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., to Officer in Charge of Supervision and
Appropriate Supervisory and Examination Staff at Each Fed. Reserve Bank and Certain Orgs.
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objective thinking, questioning, and challenging of ideas.10 Further, where
appropriate, it will encourage escalation—raising one’s hand, so to
speak—so that problems receive appropriate attention and stay small.11
Many supervisors discuss culture with a limiting adjective:
compliance culture or risk culture, for example. We tend to avoid those
terms. For one thing, they may encourage thinking about culture from a
perspective that is too narrow—for example, a perspective of controls. We
like controls as much as any supervisor. But culture, as we use the term,
consists of more than limits on discretion, the detection of mistakes, and
concepts like fallbacks, backstops, and redundancy. We believe a good
culture requires conscious choice, not merely reliable processes.12 We
want firms and bankers to make better decisions—that is, decisions that
align with the public and private purposes of a bank in the near term and
over the long term.
II.
A. So Why Culture? And Why Now?
Bill Dudley, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s former
president, has spent four decades in financial services—at the Federal
Reserve and in the private sector. As he explained in late 2013, “[t]here is
evidence of deep-seated cultural and ethical failures at many large
financial institutions. Whether this is due to size and complexity, bad
incentives, or some other issues is difficult to judge, but it is another
critical problem that needs to be addressed.”13
“Deep-seated cultural and ethical failures” is strong talk from a
central banker. The evidence supports this assessment. In the years
following the financial crisis, regulators and supervisors at the Federal
Reserve tried to focus their resources on improving stability of the
financial system and the “safety and soundness” of firms. These tasks—
challenging at any time—were made more difficult by a litany of headlinegrabbing scandals. Some of the misconduct in these scandals was illegal—
a crime or regulatory violation. Other misconduct was arguably legal but
Supervised by the Fed. Reserve (Oct. 16, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/srletters/2008/SR0808.htm [https://perma.cc/ATE4-C68U].
10. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION
MANUAL § 2126.0.5 (2019).
11. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., TRADING AND CAPITAL MARKETS ACTIVITIES
MANUAL § 2150.1 (2011).
12. See generally CAPITAL FAILURE: REBUILDING TRUST IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 15–16
(Nicholas Morris & David Vines eds., 2014).
13. William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks
at the Global Economic Policy Forum: Ending Too Big to Fail (Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.newyork
fed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud131107.html [https://perma.cc/LP76-JYYA].

688

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:683

nonetheless unethical or reckless. Some misconduct pre-dated the
financial crisis. Some coincided with it. And some occurred after 2009.
Many of our colleagues have particular examples that caused them
to say, “Enough, already!” For Dudley, it was the manipulation of the
London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)—arguably the most important
benchmark in finance—and of foreign exchange (FX) rates.14 At their
core, these scandals involved the collaboration by traders at multiple firms
to achieve benchmark or exchange rates that did not reflect actual market
conditions. For LIBOR, multiple firms admitted to fraud in the submission
of rates to the trade association that published LIBOR. The conduct by
traders at Deutsche Bank, one of several banks that pleaded guilty to
LIBOR-related violations, is indicative of similar conduct across the
industry:
[F]rom at least 2003 through early 2011, numerous Deutsche Bank
derivatives traders—whose compensation was directly connected to
their success in trading financial products tied to LIBOR—engaged
in efforts to move these benchmark rates in a direction favorable to
their trading positions. Specifically, the derivatives traders requested
that LIBOR submitters at Deutsche Bank and other banks submit
contributions favorable to trading positions, rather than rates that
complied with the definition of LIBOR. Through these schemes,
Deutsche Bank defrauded counterparties who were unaware of the
manipulation.15

In the FX context, several firms pleaded guilty to conspiring to rig
the foreign exchange market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.16
As the Department of Justice explained,
Members of “The Cartel” manipulated the euro-dollar exchange rate
by agreeing to withhold bids or offers for euros or dollars to avoid
moving the exchange rate in a direction adverse to open positions
held by co-conspirators. By agreeing not to buy or sell at certain
times, the traders protected each other’s trading positions by

14. See DAVID HOU & DAVID SKEIE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 667,
LIBOR: ORIGINS, ECONOMICS, CRISIS, SCANDAL, AND REFORM (2014); see also Press Release, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Announces Fines Totaling More Than $1.8
Billion Against Six Major Banking Organizations for Their Unsafe and Unsound Practices in Foreign
Exchange (FX) Markets (May 20, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases
/enforcement20150520a.htm [https://perma.cc/72J7-G4R2].
15. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Deutsche Bank’s London Subsidiary Agrees to Plead
Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-banks-london-subsidiary-agrees-plead-guilty-connection-long-runningmanipulation [https://perma.cc/XHF3-GP6N].
16. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
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withholding supply of or demand for currency and suppressing
competition in the FX market.17

The firms that pleaded guilty also paid billions of dollars in fines as
a result of this conduct. A number of traders were indicted for LIBOR and
FX manipulation, and many (although not all) were convicted. Three
features of these scandals stood out.
First, the misconduct was not limited to one particular firm. The
essence of these scandals was collusion across multiple firms. The
manipulation schemes depended on contacts among traders at multiple
banks in order to be successful. To some extent, the misconduct reflected
the labor market. Some traders changed jobs frequently. A professional
network at multiple firms made it easier to find another job. The traders
involved in these scandals may have perceived loyalty to peers as more
important than loyalty to employers. The norms that existed among this
group of traders—that made it acceptable to help each other regardless of
obligations to firms or clients—signaled a cultural problem, not just a
control or compliance failure.
Second, the misconduct undermined the trustworthiness of products
on which the real economy relied. The investigations, however, produced
no evidence that the traders involved considered the consequences of their
decisions on others—at least, none so far as we are aware. LIBOR and
foreign exchange rates were just numbers. Trading was just a game. But,
as colleagues at the New York Fed have explained, “[t]he impact of
employee misconduct extends beyond the individual and can [affect] the
firm as a whole and the economy and financial markets more broadly.”18
Third, these two scandals occurred sequentially. The bankers
involved in FX manipulation knew that their firms were under
investigation for LIBOR manipulation and that the investigations had
found evidence of collusion in recorded chat rooms. They continued to use
chatrooms anyway to exchange favors.
The financial crisis and subsequent scandals like LIBOR and FX
manipulation prompted others to ask similar questions. In 2014, under the
leadership of Sir David Walker, Barclays published a report by Anthony
Salz on the root causes of misconduct at that bank.19 Called the Salz
Review, the report assessed root causes of an observed “gap between
Barclays’ articulated values and the way the bank operated in practice,”
17. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas
(May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas
[https://perma.cc/U948-B38H].
18. STEPHANIE CHALY ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., MISCONDUCT RISK, CULTURE,
AND SUPERVISION 3 (2017).
19. See BARCLAYS, BUILDING THE ‘GO-TO’ BANK 126–29 (2014).
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and recommended reforms.20 The report concluded, among other things,
that “the business practices for which Barclays has rightly been criticized
were shaped predominantly by its cultures, which rested on uncertain
foundations.”21 Around the same time, the United Kingdom’s
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards looked across the
industry, and summed up its views:
[T]he weakness in standards and culture that has contributed to the
loss of public trust in banks has not been confined to isolated parts of
a few sub-standard banks. It has been more pervasive. Trust in
banking can only be restored when it has been earned, and it will only
have been earned when the deficiencies in banking standards and
culture, and the underlying causes of those deficiencies, have been
addressed.22

Other central banks were early contributors to the discussion. Mark
Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada and, later, the Bank of England,
was an early thought leader. He exhorted banks to safeguard their “social
license”23 and encouraged them to consider basic questions about their
purpose. “Who does finance serve? Itself? The real economy? Society?
And to whom is the financier responsible? Herself? His business? Their
system? The answers start from recognising that financial capitalism is not
an end in itself, but a means to promote investment, innovation, growth,
and prosperity.”24
Talk of banks serving society, or of having both public purposes and
private purposes, made some observers uncomfortable. In our view,
financial institutions—and banks in particular—are not like other
corporations. Banks play a structural role in the economy. That position
allows them to affect others, which, by necessity, requires them to make
decisions in the interest of the system. In recognition of that role, banks
20. ANTHONY SALZ, SALZ REVIEW: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BARCLAYS’ BUSINESS
PRACTICES 2 (2013).
21. Id.
22. 1 HOUSE OF LORDS & HOUSE OF COMMONS, PARLIAMENTARY COMM’N ON BANKING
STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD 15 (2013).
23. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Monetary Authority of Singapore: The
Future of Financial Reform 12 (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe
/files/speech/2014/the-future-of-financial-reform.pdf?la=en&hash=670D969367D2A4BA5D5881F1
DF4F3172836F8706 [https://perma.cc/9UNF-87U4] (“[T]rust between the public and the financial
system is needed to maintain the social license for finance to operate. . . . Without that license, the
door will be opened to a level of regulation that constrains the ability of finance to innovate and support
growth and trade efficiently.”).
24. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Conference on Inclusive Capitalism:
Inclusive Capitalism: Creating a Sense of the Systemic 8 (May 27, 2014), https://www.bankof
england.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2014/inclusive-capitalism-creating-a-sense-of-the-systemic
.pdf?la=en&hash=B727934359BD632AACCD4B65ACC36B9D7CD91966 [https://perma.cc/MSF5
-W9J9].
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receive tremendous operating benefits that are not available to other
industries—access to the discount window, for example.25 The receipt of
these benefits is what the public thinks of as a critical stakeholder (and, in
a distressed firm, as a shareholder or significant creditor), to whom banks
are accountable. After all, if banks do not somehow act for the benefit of
the public, why should they receive the benefits from the public? Finally,
banks hold themselves out as trustworthy custodians, and people trust
them with their resources for a better future. The costs of dishonesty are
too high for people who entrust their savings to banks and who depend in
so many ways on a properly functioning financial system.26
B. Limits of Statutes and Regulation
The attempted manipulation of LIBOR and FX were not the only
scandals to make headlines following the financial crisis. Often, problems
at one firm appeared at other firms. In our experience, many of these
scandals shared a common root cause: the technical aspects of rules can
obscure their social purposes. As lawyers, this pattern jumped out at us.
But before we saw these scandals as failures of culture, we saw them as
exposing the limits of what statutes and regulations can achieve.
For example, BNP Paribas and Credit Suisse faced criminal
indictments for facilitating the evasion of U.S. sanctions and taxation,
respectively.27 In both cases, legal requirements were seen as
technicalities—as games companies can outsmart. The moral salience of
the sanctions against Sudan, or of paying one’s taxes to the society in
which one earns a living, was not relevant. Instead, the organizational goal
of client service—in processing payments or facilitating flight capital—
clashed with and superseded public policy.28
25. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 42–44 (10th ed. 2016).
26. See Michael Strine, First Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the
Symposium Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Frank G. Zarb School of Business at Hofstra
University and Looking Ahead to the Next 50 Years of Business Education: Forming the Next
Generation of Bankers: The Future of Business Education and Ethics (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.
newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2016/str160322 [https://perma.cc/ER82-XYWK].
27. See Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued
Upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as Amended, In the Matter of BNP
Paribas S.A., Docket No. 14-022-B-FB (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Autorite de
Controle Prudentiel et de Resolution June 30, 2014); Order to Cease and Desist and Order of
Assessment of Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, as Amended, In the Matter of Credit Suisse AG, Docket No. 14-009-B-FB (Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys. May 19, 2014).
28. See Thomas C. Baxter, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Remarks at the New Compliance Landscape: Increasing Roles – Increasing Risks Conference:
Reflections on the New Compliance Landscape (July 23, 2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org
/newsevents/speeches/2014/bax072314 [https://perma.cc/UY98-6UWD].
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A lack of “other-regarding” conduct29 was also evident in an example
of civil enforcement by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) against JPMorgan Ventures Energy Corporation, a direct
subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan).30 A division of
JPMorgan owned output contracts from several older power plants in
California. These plants, which burned fossil fuels to produce power, were
profit-generating in periods of high energy consumption.31 However, they
were overall money-losers because their cost of energy was much higher
than solar- or wind-based power production. JPMorgan’s traders
discovered a loophole in bidding regulations published by California’s
state energy authority. If an older plant were selected to produce power in
an auction among power providers for any given hour, it would also
receive a contract to produce power for the two hours on either side. This
was called “ramping up” and “ramping down” and was necessary because
power plants cannot just be turned on and off—turbines need time to spin,
both when coming on-line and going off-line.32
JPMorgan’s traders knew that their aging plants could never compete
on cost, so what could they do? FERC’s enforcement order chronicles
twelve bidding strategies that took advantage of the market administrator’s
bidding platform. In one of the strategies, the traders realized that if they
submitted a below-market bid between 11:00 p.m. and midnight,
California’s auction algorithm would select it, even though the bid was
money-losing. The purpose was not to win the auction for that hour, but to
take advantage of “ramping up” and “ramping down” rules. In their
submission for the following day, the traders would enter bids at the
system maximum ($999/MWh) for the hours after midnight, even though
the market price was $12/MWh range, knowing the bidding regulations
required payment to these aging plants.33 They made a fortune; JPMorgan
ultimately agreed to a $125,000,000 disgorgement of unjust profits in
addition to a $285,000,000 penalty.34 They also increased the cost to
consumers during those five hours. These and other facts stipulated to by
JPMorgan led FERC’s enforcement division to conclude that the firm’s

29. See Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and Ethics in
Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 217 (2013) (The “norm of ‘other regarding’ behavior
within financial services firms, [as] one which, to the fullest extent possible, attempts to induce firms
to take into account the private and social costs of their decisions.”).
30. See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, Make-Whole Payments and
Related Bidding Strategies, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068 (Jul. 13, 2013).
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id. at 10–11.
34. Id. at 1.
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bids were not grounded in the normal forces of supply and demand,
and they were expected to, and did, lose money at market rates.
[JPMorgan’s] purpose in submitting the bids was not to make money
based on market fundamentals, but to create artificial conditions that
would cause the [market administrator] to pay [JPMorgan] outside
the market at premium rates.35

Who uses power in the middle of the night? Hospitals and other
critical infrastructure—places like fire stations, police stations, water
treatment plants, and other installations that cannot go off-line. Did the
consequences of their trades ever occur to the energy traders at JPMorgan?
Or were they playing a game that, in their culture, was independent of any
real-world consequences?
In each of the foregoing examples, technical rules arguably obscured
the reasons for enacting the rules in the first place. Or, at the very least,
they appear to have induced bankers to adopt a posture of gamesmanship.
Technical rules raise questions about the limits of what laws and
regulations can accomplish. The variations of this principle will be
familiar to those schooled in public policy. It is impossible to create a rule
for every situation. Gaps in a regulatory regime are inevitable.36 Groups
will develop shared norms for filling those gaps. So, for that reason alone,
we need to look to culture as well as laws for solutions.
In addition, the pace of rulemaking is not always commensurate with
the pace of rule-breaking. Focusing exclusively on rulemaking creates a
risk of fighting last year’s scandal. What is more, laws are good at setting
the outer limit of acceptable behavior—behavior that is clearly prohibited.
They are less frequently and less reliably used to define what is optimal or
what is good.37 A regime dependent on bright-line rules may, strangely,
entice people to walk right up to the edge of a rule—or to find creative
ways around the rules. A proliferation of technical rules prompts us to ask
what we can do, not what we should do. Another way of looking at this
problem is that technical rules also present a bright line where little
judgment is required. When individuals do not have to apply judgment
often, they get out of practice. We do not make good judgments when we
35. Id. at 14.
36. See Awrey et al., supra note 29, at 199 (“It would be extremely costly in most cases, if not
entirely impossible, to articulate legal rules which envision the entire universe of potential future states
of the world. These costs invariably give rise to gaps between what the law says, on the one hand, and
what its drafters (freed from the shackles of imperfect information, bounded rationality, and other
constraints) would have wanted it to say, on the other.” (emphasis added)).
37. Michael Held, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at Yale Law
School’s Chirelstein Colloquium: Reforming Culture and Conduct in the Financial Services
Industry - How Can Lawyers Help? 3 (Mar. 2017), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches
/2017/hel170308 [https://perma.cc/R2AM-63BD].
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usually do not have to make judgments at all. Our moral or ethical muscle
memory can grow weak without a workout.
Enforcement actions cannot be the only remedy. Enforcement is
after-the-fact, and its power to deter future misconduct is uncertain.
Criminal enforcement requires proof of state-of-mind, which can be
difficult to determine in a corporate setting when many people (including
lawyers) are involved in decision-making. Prosecutors and civil
enforcement authorities must make difficult resource allocation decisions
that preclude them from responding to every offense, thus limiting the
deterrent effect of their powers.
In short, rules are necessary, but not sufficient. Culture—the shared
norms of an organization—also contributes to behavior and decision
making. We return, therefore, to a view espoused by Gerald Corrigan
almost four decades ago: banks have “unique public responsibilities and
may therefore be subject to implicit codes of conduct or explicit
regulations that do not fall on other institutions.”38 There is arguably a
need for greater emphasis on the implicit codes or norms that can support
or undermine explicit regulations.
C. A Role for Prudential Supervision?
Other members of the New York Fed’s working group on culture
were in the Supervision Group. While the lawyers tended to look at the
limits and unintended effects of laws and regulations, supervisors began
to consider culture through the lenses of microprudential and
macroprudential supervision.
As noted above, supervision is a distinctive feature of banking
oversight.39 Supervisors at the Federal Reserve and many other central
banks generally speak of two types of supervision: microprudential and
macroprudential. Microprudential supervision refers to supervision that is
largely firm-specific. Its purpose is to make sure that banks are “run in a
‘prudent’ and ‘safe and sound’ manner and are not taking excessive
risks.”40 This makes banks less likely to fail, avoiding adverse
consequences to customers.41 Macroprudential supervision, by contrast,
refers to supervision of the financial system. Its byword is “stability,” and
it seeks to avoid another financial crisis by examining “(1) risks that can
arise because of substantial interconnections among financial firms and (2)
risks that can develop more broadly in the financial system, including at
38. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINN., ANNUAL REPORT OF 1982: ARE BANKS SPECIAL? (1982).
39. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 1. Certain non-bank financial institutions are also subject
to supervision, but we will discuss only banks here to keep things simple.
40. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 1, at 57.
41. Id. at 58.
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other financial institutions, in financial markets, and in the general market
infrastructures.”42
From a microprudential perspective, an assessment of a firm’s
culture may provide insight into how to avoid certain risky behavior. One
dimension of microprudential supervision where culture may be
particularly relevant concerns a firm’s legal and compliance risks.43
Employee misconduct—which in many instances may be the result of a
poor corporate culture—often has legal consequences for firms. At the
very least, it may consume resources on internal investigations, lead to
costly controls and regulatory penalties, divert management attention from
revenue-generating projects, and damage a firm’s public reputation.
Early in our work in culture, we held several conversations with
prosecutors and defense attorneys (many of whom were former
prosecutors) about why corporate employees commit financial crimes. We
heard some of what is described as a “cost-benefit” approach to following
the law—that is, a conscious or subconscious weighing of the likelihood
of getting caught against the possible outcomes. Largely, however, the
answers struck us as more “cultural” and less calculating than we
expected. Peer pressure, or the desire to be liked, was one common
explanation, especially for more junior employees. A misguided desire to
“help the company” also drove many not only to commit misconduct, but
also to cover it up. Employees with track records of success also
commonly experienced a fear of failure. These employees who committed
misconduct may have felt pressure to preserve a self-image, apart from
any financial benefit. Finally, the allegiances of the traders involved in the
LIBOR and FX scandals, in particular, appeared to run toward one
another, almost as a guild of traders, rather than to their employers or
customers. In sum, an individual employee’s perceptions of peer practices,
corporate expectations, professional loyalties, and personal reputation all
contributed to poor decisions and behaviors. The factors, therefore, are
relevant to the supervision of legal and compliance risk.
Preet Bharara, the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, has presented a more structured view of the cultural factors
that contribute to corporate crime. In his experience, three types of cultures
42. Id. at 99.
43. The Board of Governors defines “compliance risk” as “the risk of regulatory sanctions, fines,
penalties or losses resulting from failure to comply with laws, rules, regulations, or other supervisory
requirements applicable to a financial institution,” and “legal risk” as “the potential that actions against
the institution that result in unenforceable contracts, lawsuits, legal sanctions, or adverse judgments
can disrupt or otherwise negatively affect the operations or condition of a financial institution.” BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING RISK
MANAGEMENT AT SUPERVISED INSTITUTIONS WITH TOTAL CONSOLIDATED ASSETS LESS THAN $50
BILLION 1 (2016).
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tend to yield misconduct: minimalism, formalism, and silence.44
“Minimalism” is the attitude of doing as little as possible to comply with
the rules. “Formalism” is the quality of equating what’s right with what’s
legal. “Silence” is not raising your hand when you see something that is
wrong. These three models of culture may also contribute to decisions and
behaviors that are ill-advised, if not illegal. Remaining silent in a new
product vetting meeting, for example, could limit the effectiveness of a
discussion about the propriety of the product for certain types of
customers. Focusing narrowly on technical minima in conducting
customer due diligence reviews could lead analysts to overlook broader
trends that may affect the firm’s risk management.
There is another, perhaps more direct reason why culture matters to
a firm’s legal risk. Federal prosecutors consider a corporation’s culture in
deciding whether to indict the firm. Two of the ten factors in the
Department of Justice’s “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations” expressly address culture.45 When prosecutors consider a
firm’s “history of similar misconduct,” one of the ten factors, they do so
because “[a] history of similar misconduct may be probative of a corporate
culture that encouraged, or at least condoned, such misdeeds, regardless
of any compliance programs.”46 Similarly, in considering the
“pervasiveness of wrongdoing,” another of the factors, prosecutors are
advised that “the most important [factor] is the role and conduct of
management. Although acts of even low-level employees may result in
criminal liability, a corporation is directed by its management and
management is responsible for a corporate culture in which criminal
conduct is either discouraged or tacitly encouraged.”47 Given the scale of
penalties for corporate crime, it makes sense that firms manage their
cultures as part of managing their legal risk.
Turning to macroprudential concerns, some aspects of culture
appeared to be common to the industry, not unique to specific firms.
Misconduct following the financial crisis was too frequent and widespread
to blame credibly a few “bad apples.” Some common cultural norms may
have also contributed to the financial crisis itself. As the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission observed, industry norms—in particular, the “erosion

44. Hon. Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York’s Conference: Criminal Accountability and Culture (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.new
yorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/governance-and-culture-reform/PreetBharara-Remarks-CultureConference [https://perma.cc/FJA8-HRNZ].
45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.300 (2018).
46. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.600(B) (2008).
47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.500(B) (2008).
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of standards of responsibility and ethics”—were partially to blame for the
crisis.48
The empirical case for considering culture as a macroprudential risk
has not been highly elaborated. Still, around the time that the New York
Fed’s work on culture began, others were already persuaded that some
connection exists. The Financial Stability Board, for example, argued in
2014 that “weaknesses in risk culture are often considered a root cause of
the global financial crisis, headline risk and compliance events.”49 The
same year, regulators in the United Kingdom observed that “the behaviour
and culture within banks played a major role in the 2008–2009 financial
crisis and in conduct scandals such as Payment Protection Insurance (PPI)
mis-selling and the attempted manipulation of LIBOR.”50
There were at least three arguments for treating industry culture as a
macroprudential concern: First, a poor culture could undermine efforts to
improve the stability of the financial system. Higher capital requirements,
more realistic liquidity and funding analyses, and new compliance and
reporting enhancements were important bulwarks against another
systemic collapse. But, as the Financial Stability Board has stated, “fines
and redress payments are losses that deplete the loss-absorbing capacity of
a financial institution.”51 Moreover, if the people managing capital
cushions fail to do so responsibly, or if powerful incentives exist to work
around regulatory reporting requirements, these reforms could become
illusory.52
Second, the industry has, in the eyes of many, become characterized
by misconduct, which has eroded its trustworthiness. One report by the
Financial Stability Board observed that “the scale in some financial
institutions has risen to a level that has the potential to create systemic
risks and undermine trust in financial institutions and markets.”53
Substitutes for trustworthiness tended to be expensive, putting pressure on
48. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xxii (2011).
49. FIN. STABILITY BD., GUIDANCE ON SUPERVISORY INTERACTION WITH FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS ON RISK CULTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RISK CULTURE 1 (2014). The paper
did not endorse a particular definition of “risk culture,” but referred in a footnote to a working
definition proposed by the International Institute of Finance: “norms of behaviour for individuals and
groups within an organisation that determine the collective ability to identify and understand, openly
discuss and act on the organisations current and future risk.” Id. at 1 n.6.
50. BANK OF ENG. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY IN
BANKING: A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR INDIVIDUALS 5 (2014).
51. FIN. STABILITY BD., STOCKTAKE OF EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS
TO MITIGATE MISCONDUCT RISKS 1 (2017).
52. See also Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and Ethics
in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 204 (2013) (pointing out that post-crisis statutes
and regulations “share a common approach . . . which attempts to dictate or directly influence how
market participants act. They do not, however, attempt to mold how people think when they act”).
53. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 51, at i.
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bank balance sheets and the ability of the industry to meet the needs of
customers. As Bill Dudley explained,
The short-term consequences of a lack of trustworthiness—such as
supervisory orders, fines, or other civil or criminal penalties—may
be finite and passing. The long-term consequences, however, may be
more serious and enduring. Increased regulation—sometimes an
inefficient substitute for trust—could limit the scope and scale of
activities of financial firms. Employees may choose to apply their
talents in other, less controversial fields instead of finance.
Customers might look outside of traditional channels for financial
services. Shareholders could downgrade their expectations about
future returns and reduce their exposures to the financial sector.54

These are long-term risks to financial stability. We tend to think of
the long-term challenges facing financial services as technological. They
may also be cultural.
Third, and perhaps most important, pervasive misconduct erodes
public support for intervention in times of crisis. Despite well-meaning
efforts, financial crises appear unavoidable from a historical perspective.
The public (or political) will to intervene depends on an assessment of the
industry’s utility. In times of crisis, the question is ultimately very simple:
Are we better off with the industry? If owing to a loss of trustworthiness,
that answer is “no,” then financial stability may suffer. Our effectiveness
to intervene in a crisis is limited by the public’s will to allow an
intervention. Why would the public want us to intervene to save an
industry that is not trusted?
Regulators and supervisors should be concerned about the industry’s
culture because an industry characterized by misconduct reflects poorly
on its regulators and supervisors. Accountability demands that the official
sector answer the question: “If misconduct is a grave problem, are you
doing all you can to stop it?” If we are not looking at all the possible root
causes of misconduct, including organizational culture, we may not be
able to respond to that question with an honest “yes.”
III.
Central banks and other regulators and supervisors across the world
have pursued varied approaches to culture. Volumes could be (and, in
some cases, have been) written about these initiatives. Our contribution
54. William C. Dudley, Former President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Remarks at Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Strengthening Culture
for the Long Term 1–2 (June 18, 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/
governance-and-culture-reform/Dudley-cultureconference-180618.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PZDT5VT].
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here is organizing these efforts into categories and giving them context by
arranging them on a spectrum to facilitate a studied comparison. In our
view, the official sector has pursued five distinct approaches to culture,
listed here in order of increasing prescription: (i) convening, speaking, and
publishing; (ii) offering official guidance; (iii) incorporating behavioral
science concepts in supervision; (iv) mandating self-assessment; and (v)
issuing new accountability regulation. These approaches are not mutually
exclusive and are often used in conjunction.
A. Convening, Speaking, and Publishing
The most common and least prescriptive approach is to use central
bank or regulatory convening power and the bully pulpit. Many authorities
have summoned the industry (a captive audience) to panels and
conferences about the importance of culture, and many public sector
leaders have been outspoken about the importance of the subject. In
addition to Mark Carney,55 Norman Chan, the Chief Executive of the Hong
Kong Monetary Authority,56 and Christine Lagarde, the President of the
European Central Bank and former Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund,57 are two outspoken proponents of the importance of
improving culture in financial services.
Some public authorities have reported publicly on the results of
inquiries into supervised firms. The Central Bank of Ireland, for example,
examined five retail banks in light of a post-crisis mortgage scandal.58 Its
report criticized the banks for a culture that prized short-term financial
goals over consumer protection and created a sense of over-optimism
when those short-term goals were exceeded.59 In addition, the banks had
failed to manage cultural norms ahead of misconduct, resulting in a
“firefighting” approach to scandal.60 The Central Bank of Ireland
recommended that the five banks pursue stronger diversity initiatives to
55. See Carney, supra note 23 at 13; Carney, supra note 24, at 9–10.
56. Norman T.L. Chan, Chief Exec., H.K. Monetary Auth., Speech at Asian Banker Summit:
How Can the Banking Industry Regain the Moral and Ethical Highground it Once Enjoyed Before the
Global Financial Crisis (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/
speeches/2015/04/20150415-1 [https://perma.cc/23N3-TUBN] (“[T]here is considerable public
interest in ensuring that banking, which remains the predominant channel of intermediation between
savers and borrowers in our society, functions efficiently and effectively, with a high degree of
professionalism and strong ethical standards.”).
57. See Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir. of the Int’l Monetary Fund, Address at the Conference
on Inclusive Capitalism: Economic Inclusion and Financial Integrity (May 27, 2014),
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp052714 [https://perma.cc/V69A-K7ZG]
(“Trust is the lifeblood of the modern business economy . . . . To restore trust, we need a shift toward
greater integrity and accountability. We need a stronger and systematic ethical dimension.”).
58. CENT. BANK OF IR., BEHAVIOUR AND CULTURE OF THE IRISH RETAIL BANKS 5 (2018).
59. Id. at 1–5.
60. Id.
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combat organizational silos and evidence of “group think” within those
silos.61
Another example is the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s
report of its inquiry into the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, a bank
with multiple misconduct scandals.62 The report concluded that sustained
success, especially through the financial crisis, “dulled the senses of the
institution.” Year after year, the firm under-valued and under-invested in
compliance and other risk management functions. As a result, the firm
made key decisions without adequate challenge, did not hold individuals
accountable, and overlooked customer interests and complaints. These
flaws were the product of “cultural factors,” many of which were also
identified by the Central Bank of Ireland in its report. Beyond
complacency attributable to sustained financial success, the
Commonwealth Bank of Australia suffered from a lack of self-reflection,
a reactive approach to risks, and an overemphasis on consensus at the
expense of diverse points of view.
B. Official Guidance
Beyond speeches and publications, several authorities have issued
official guidance about culture. Guidance is an agency’s official statement
of policy. It often contains interpretations of laws and regulations, and
recommendations for compliance, but it lacks the legal power to compel
adherence.
For example, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority published
guidance on culture in March 2017.63 Its approach sets out three pillars for
a sound corporate culture: governance, incentives, and assessment. The
governance pillar emphasized traditional notions—“tone from the top,”
for example—and provided more granular recommendations, such as a
board-level committee dedicated to culture. The committee would “review
and confirm the effectiveness of the overall culture enhancement
initiatives pursued by the institution.”64 Regarding incentives, the
guidance recommended a separate performance rating for adherence to
corporate values. A separate performance rating would focus the attention
of managers and staff on demonstrating their embrace of those principles
throughout the year. The guidance also recommended monetary rewards
61. Id.
62. See generally AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGULATORY AUTH., PRUDENTIAL INQUIRY INTO THE
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA FINAL REPORT (2018) (explaining the scandals associated
with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia).
63. Letter from H.K. Monetary Auth., to the Chief Exec., All Authorized Institutions 1–3 (Mar.
2, 2017), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-circular/2017/20
170302e2.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3RE-KD4Z].
64. Id. at 2.

2020]

Bank Culture and the Official Sector

701

and recognition for staff demonstrating exemplary behavior. For the third
pillar—assessment—the Hong Kong guidance encouraged firms to
implement escalation policies that include confidential channels so that
staff could raise concerns about illegal or unethical conduct without fear
of reprisal.
Another example below explains the Financial Conduct Authority’s
guidance on the United Kingdom’s new “Conduct Rules.” The official
rules are framed positively (“You shall,” as opposed to “You shall not”)
and at a very high level (for example, “You shall act with integrity”).
Official guidance, however, offers multiple examples, drawn from actual
supervisory findings and enforcement actions, of how each of those
principles may be violated—the “You shall nots.” For example, Rule 1 is
“You shall act with integrity.” Official guidance supplements these
principles with real world examples of potential violations. The rule of
integrity would prohibit, among other things, falsifying documents,
mismarking the value of investments or trading positions, providing
altered prices on illiquid or off-exchange contracts, providing false or
inaccurate information to a regulator, failing to disclose personal account
dealings, designing transactions to disguise breaches of law or regulation,
or failing to inform a customer about a material issue.65
C. Behavioral Science and Supervision
The Dutch central bank pioneered behavioral science into
supervision (De Nederlandsche Bank, or “DNB”). Its supervisors literally
wrote the book on incorporating behavior science in supervision.66
The DNB launched its Governance, Culture, and Organizational
Behavior Supervision Program in 2010. The program team is comprised
of experienced supervisors and industrial or organizational psychologists.
Its premise is that behavior has a predictive value with respect to future
performance—i.e., risky behavior may already be apparent before
financial performance is compromised. Therefore, it makes sense to
examine behavior to mitigate bad outcomes.
The Dutch approach focused on two aspects of culture: group
dynamics and change. In the first, supervisors look for “patterns in
decision-making, leadership, communication, group dynamics and
mindsets of . . . management boards,” assess the risks of those patterns to
that particular institution, and recommend changes.67 These groups tend to
exhibit similar patterns of behavior, including CEO dominance, a lack of
65. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CODE OF CONDUCT § 4 (2019).
66. See DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE: FOUNDATIONS,
PRACTICE & FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS (2015).
67. Id. at 19.
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effective challenge, and a lack of self-reflection. In the second type of
review, supervisors assess “the ability of financial institutions to
implement major changes.”68 Changes are not only necessary in times of
acute stress. Change has more generally become a way of life for financial
services firms, which must contend with new competition, new customer
expectations, and new technology. The key concern in this review is how
firms are able to set priorities among the many dynamic conditions they
face.
These reviews are data driven. To conduct a review, DNB specialists
consult with the dedicated supervisory team to select one or two concrete
decisions for review.69 Examples might include a decision on strategy
(whether or not to restart a particular line of business), personnel (a c-suite
selection viewed by the lead supervisor as unsuccessful), or a cultural issue
illustrating the mindset of the organization (people do not feel that they
have job security). The team then looks at who was involved in the
decision, what process, rationale, or influence was used to arrive at the
decision, and any documents available about the decision. Much of the
review comprises desk research,70 but the DNB also uses self-assessment
forms, interviews, and, to a limited extent, direct observations of board or
executive committee meetings.71 In presenting their findings, the DNB
specialists do not opine on the wisdom or technical soundness of the
outcome of a decision—although those aspects of a decision may be
reviewed by supervisors for other purposes. Rather, the specialists offer
feedback and suggestions on the process for arriving at a particular
decision based on observable behaviors, the norms, and the group
dynamics that those behaviors evidence. The DNB has implemented
safeguards to avoid individual examiner bias and intuition from
influencing supervisory conclusions, including rigorous peer challenge.72
D. Mandatory Self-Assessment
Since 2014, some foreign supervisors have made self-assessment
mandatory for supervised firms. The United Kingdom’s Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) introduced its “5 Conduct Questions
Programme” in 2015.73 It is, in our view, a practice leader. The five
questions that target the risk of misconduct are:
68. Id. at 20.
69. Id. at 76.
70. Id. at 75.
71. Id. at 77–83.
72. Id. at 85–86.
73. 5 Conduct Questions Programme, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (May 28, 2019), https://www.fca.
org.uk/firms/5-conduct-questions-programme [https://perma.cc/Z5BJ-E9QZ].
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1. What proactive steps do you take as a firm to identify the conduct
risks inherent within your business?
2. How do you encourage the individuals who work in front,
middle, back office, control, and support functions to feel and be
responsible for managing the conduct of their business?
3. What support (broadly defined) does the firm put in place to
enable those who work for it to improve the conduct of their
business or function?
4. How does the Board and [senior management] gain oversight of
the conduct of business within their organization and, equally
importantly, how does the Board or [senior management]
consider the conduct implications of the strategic decisions that
they make?
5. Has the firm assessed whether there are any other activities that
it undertakes that could undermine strategies put in place to
improve conduct?74
The FCA poses these questions to banks in the wholesale market—
approximately thirty firms. The purpose of the questions is to prompt
discussion within firms about culture and conduct and their effects on risk
management. For three years running, the FCA has published summaries
of firm responses and a horizontal supervisory assessment.75 The key
message in the 2018 report was that some firms have fallen behind peers
in their efforts to mitigate misconduct risk.76 The report provided examples
of both strong and weak approaches as a benchmark. A focus of the 2019
report was on “speak-up culture”—”the willingness and opportunities for
staff to challenge and discuss issues as a normal day-to-day activity,
including escalating issues where needed.”77 The FCA found that, in
general, firms had programs that facilitated and channeled employee
feedback and whistleblowing, but struggled to change the mindset that this
manner of communication was acceptable and encouraged.

74. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ‘5 CONDUCT QUESTIONS’: INDUSTRY FEEDBACK FOR 2017, at 2
(2018).
75. 5 Conduct Questions Programme, supra note 73.
76. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 74, at 4 (“While many of the larger firms have marshalled
the resources for these important initiatives, many firms still remain in early planning stages. Conduct
is important for the whole of the financial services industry. Larger firms who have prioritised other
initiatives and smaller firms that may lack the immediate resources to launch comprehensive
programmes still face the downside risks that arise from poor conduct.”).
77. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ‘PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES’: 5 CONDUCT QUESTIONS INDUSTRY
FEEDBACK FOR 2018/19, at 5 (2019). Later in the report, the FCA described the related concept of
“psychological safety” as confidence that employees “can speak up and won’t be humiliated, ignored,
or blamed.” Id. at 10.
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Mandatory self-assessment is a feature of the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority’s recent update of its supervisory program on culture.78
Supervised firms must ask how their governance structures and policies
influence their organizational culture, implement changes, and report on
their progress. Firms are encouraged to include lessons learned in the
course of their work as a way of avoiding a “check-the-box” approach to
complying with the new self-assessment requirement. Supervisors will
review reports, conduct focus groups to confirm their content, and provide
feedback to firms.
E. Individual Accountability Regimes
Individual accountability regimes impose new statutory and
regulatory duties on individual bankers and new oversight responsibilities
on supervisors. A focus on accountability for senior leaders, in particular,
may prompt them to invest time and other resources in understanding and
mitigating the root causes of prior misconduct.
In recent years, the United Kingdom has overhauled its financial
regulation to promote a culture of responsibility and trustworthiness in
financial services. New legislation mandated regulators to introduce
tougher rules in relation to individual accountability.79 Those regulators,
in turn, issued new rules designed expressly to “shape the culture,
standards and policies of a firm as a whole and . . . promote more positive
behaviours that actively support the regulators’ statutory objectives.”80
The United Kingdom’s new individual accountability regime81 has
three parts. First, the regime utilizes enforceable “Conduct Rules” that
apply to almost all bank employees.82 As described above, the rules are
high-level principles, written in general terms to allow for wide
applicability across diverse lines of business and job functions. The FCA
has encouraged firms to provide training tailored to how those rules apply
78. Letter from H.K. Monetary Auth., to the Chief Exec., All Authorized Institutions 1 (Mar. 2,
2017), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-circular/2018/2018
1219e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9U6-5BMP].
79. See generally Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, 2013 (c. 33) (Eng.).
80. BANK OF ENG. PRUDENTIAL AUTH. & FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER:
STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY IN BANKING: A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
INDIVIDUALS 38 (2014).
81. The discussion of the U.K. “senior managers and certification” regime in this article focuses
on that regime as it applies to banks. The regime also currently applies to building societies, credit
unions, and insurers. All other regulated firms will become subject to a version of the regime from
December 2019. The extended regime is meant to be proportionate, so different categories of firms
will be subject to different requirements depending on their activities, size, and risk profiles.
82. See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CODE OF CONDUCT § 2 (2019). The express purpose of
the U.K.’s new Conduct Rules is to “shape the culture standards and policies of a firm as a whole
and . . . promote more positive behaviours that actively support the regulators’ statutory objectives.”
BANK OF ENG. PRUDENTIAL AUTH. & FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 80, § 5.2.
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in particular business areas.83 Firms are required to report to regulators any
disciplinary action84 taken as a result of breaches of the Conduct Rules.85
Second, a new “Senior Managers Regime” requires candidates for
certain board and executive management positions to receive pre-approval
from a regulator.86 Once appointed, they become subject to a “duty of
responsibility” to take reasonable steps to prevent regulatory breaches in
the areas of the firm for which they are responsible.87 Senior managers
may also face criminal liability for making a decision that causes a firm to
fail,88 albeit this would only apply in a relatively narrow set of
circumstances. The keystone of the Senior Managers Regime is a
mandatory and formally documented allocation of responsibilities. Firms
must ensure that there are no gaps in accountability for their activities, as
well as allocate a number of responsibilities that have been “prescribed”
by the regulators, which represent priority areas of regulatory focus.89 This
process gives supervisors insight into the actual responsibilities of a firm’s
senior leadership. It also enables regulators to judge the appropriateness
of an individual for a certain role. Moreover, it provides clarity as to who
among a firm’s leadership can be held individually accountable for illegal
or otherwise unsound conduct in a particular area. In other words, the
allocation of responsibilities answers the question of where the buck stops.
Two of the prescribed responsibilities mandated by regulation address
culture.90 Including culture on a regulatory list of leadership
responsibilities, make it very likely that “culture” will be on the permanent
agenda of a firm’s management committee and board of directors. It also
places a personal onus on the relevant Senior Managers to demonstrate
that they are taking reasonable steps to lead the development of a firm’s
culture and overseeing its adoption in day-to-day management.
Third, firms must administer a “Certification Regime” where they
regularly assess the “fitness and propriety” of other individuals who could
83. Senior Managers and Certification Regime Banking Stocktake Report, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.
(May 8, 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/senior-managers-and-certifi
cation-regime-banking-stocktake-report [https://perma.cc/6UJH-W2TT].
84. “Disciplinary action” for these purposes means a formal written warning, suspension or
dismissal of the person, and/or reduction or recovery of any of the person’s remuneration due to a
breach of a conduct requirement. See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000 (c. 8, § 60C) (Eng.).
Suspensions imposed pending the results of an internal investigation are not considered disciplinary
action. Id.
85. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK § 15.11 (2019) [hereinafter FCA HANDBOOK];
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., PRA RULEBOOK § 11 (2019) [hereinafter PRA RULEBOOK].
86. Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, 2013 (c. 33, § 18) (Eng.).
87. Id. § 32.
88. Id. § 36.
89. FCA HANDBOOK, supra note 85, § 24; PRA RULEBOOK, supra note 85, at Allocation of
Responsibilities.
90. PRA RULEBOOK, supra note 85, § 4.1.
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pose a risk of significant harm to the firm or its customers.91 An important
element of certification is a requirement that firms check references for the
past six years of employment history before certifying that employees are
“fit and proper”92 (the obligation to check references also applies to
prospective Senior Managers and other non-executive directors). Like the
New York Fed’s database proposal, the U.K.’s new reference rules impose
two new legal duties on regulated firms: a duty to inquire of past
employers (including non-financial companies) and a duty to provide
information. References must disclose all information that would be
relevant to an assessment of whether an individual is fit and proper. Unlike
the New York Fed’s proposal, employers will not receive immunity for
the contents of such references. They face the same liability to former
employees that they would without any legal duty to disclose. They also
owe a general duty to a prospective employer to write a reference that is
accurate and, taken as a whole, not misleading. A firm may, therefore, find
itself in the unenviable position of treble legal risk. A former employee
may sue for including too much information in a reference, a prospective
employer may disagree and sue for including too little, and a regulator may
scrutinize the reference for compliance with legal minima.
IV.
The New York Fed’s work on culture has proceeded along several
lines decidedly on the less intrusive end of the spectrum.
A. Convening Power and the Bully Pulpit
From the outset, the New York Fed’s goal has been to shine a
spotlight on the issue of corporate culture. It has relied principally on
convening industry participants and other interested parties and in
advocating for heightened attention to culture through public speeches.
The New York Fed has hosted several major conferences for the
industry and regulators on the topic of culture. Prominent officials have
delivered keynote addresses. CEOs, directors, and asset managers
participate on panels, with some participants returning year after year. The
purpose of these discussions is to exchange ideas about what works and
what does not and to identify opportunities for productive collaboration.
For example, Betsy Duke joined two panels in which she discussed the
challenges of being a director and later chairman at Wells Fargo following

91. FCA HANDBOOK, supra note 85, § 27; PRA RULEBOOK, supra note 85, at Certification.
92. FCA HANDBOOK, supra note 85, § 22; PRA RULEBOOK, supra note 85, at Fitness and
Propriety § 5.
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its customer account scandal.93 Supervisors, prosecutors, and academics
have also joined panel discussions to explain their approaches to culture.
Detailed summaries for each of these conferences and many video
excerpts are available on the New York Fed’s public website.94
The conferences have also taught us just how difficult the topic of
culture is. One recurring theme is the potential for ethics and markets to
be irreconcilable. That is, there are only so many times a market
participant can say “no” to a business opportunity based on an ethical
principle and expect to remain in business. At some point, competitors will
say “yes” seeing the business opportunity. Over the long-term, this
dynamic can reduce standards in an industry. Federal Reserve Vice
Chairman Stanley Fischer explored this theme at the New York Fed’s
annual culture conference in 2015.95 He distributed to the audience a quote
from a book by Nobel Laureates George Akerlof and Robert Schiller:
Whether or not businessmen have good (or bad) morals is not the
subject of this book, although sometimes both of these sides will
appear. Instead, we see the basic problem as pressures for less than
scrupulous behavior that is incentivized in competitive markets. They
are terrific at incentivizing and rewarding businessmen heroes with
innovative new products for which there is real need. However,
unregulated free markets rarely reward a different kind of heroism,
of those who restrain themselves from taking advantage of
customers’ psychological or informational weaknesses. Because of
competitive pressures, managers who restrain themselves in this way
tend to be replaced by others with fewer moral qualms. Civil society
and social norms do place some brakes on such phishing; but in the
resulting market equilibrium, if there is an opportunity to phish, even
firms guided by those with real moral integrity will usually have to
do so in order to compete and survive.96

93. See Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Progress,
Challenges, and the Next Generation of Leaders, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (June 18, 2018),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/governance-and-culture-reform/2018-NewYork
Fed-Culture-Conference-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS99-XBWA]; Workshop on Culture
Measurement and Assessment, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (June 21, 2017), https://www.newyorkfed
.org/medialibrary/media/governance-and-culture-reform/Summary-of-Workshop.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3HSS-TN9D].
94. See generally Governance and Culture Reform, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/governance-and-culture-reform [https://perma.cc/86NF-TVWW].
95. Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Workshop on Progress
and Challenges, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., 4 (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
medialibrary/media/newsevents/events/banking/2015/culture_workshop_summary_2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SE5K-YDPV].
96. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF
MANIPULATION & DECEPTION xi–xii (2015).
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In a discussion with Christine Lagarde, Vice Chairman Fischer asked
whether there was something fundamental in markets that was
incompatible with ethics.97 That is, does market competition inevitably
lead to a race to the bottom? If one participant is not willing to do
“whatever it takes” to make a buck, the next participant will. And, there
are only so many times that a market participant can say “no”—only so
many opportunities that can be passed up—before going out of business.
If that is true, is postcrisis misconduct an inescapably downward trend?
The New York Fed has also organized two less publicized forums to
discuss culture. The Supervisors Roundtable is a semi-annual meeting of
senior supervisors from approximately twenty agencies from many
jurisdictions. Its purpose is to share approaches to the supervision of
culture and to develop a toolkit. The newest convening effort is a business
school-industry working group called the Education and Industry Forum
on Financial Services Culture.98 Its goal is to encourage universities and
financial firms to work on promoting ethics as a skill set, both in the
classroom and in employer training. The initiative began a few years ago
with some rather uncomfortable meetings, in which academics and
bankers sat around a table saying, “It’s your fault. No, it’s your fault.”
Now, both sides are eager to work together and the New York Fed helps
facilitate that discussion on an ongoing basis.
In addition to engaging bankers and supervisors, we have also tried
to interest lawyers in the topic of the culture of financial services. For
example, in 2016, we partnered with the Federal Bar Council in New York
City to host a seminar addressing how banking lawyers can import
professional, ethical standards to the clients they serve. The discussion
picked up on discussions in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
about the wisdom of treating banking as a “profession”—complete with
ethical codes, self-governing bodies, and entrance standards. Judge Jed S.
Rakoff moderated a two-hour panel discussion that covered the following
topics.
1. Should banking lawyers have special responsibilities to the
public? This discussion challenged the traditional client-centric
obligations by asking whether lawyers who work in an industry with so
many public responsibilities should also owe a heightened duty to the
public as well as to their clients. At the very least, under the Model Rules
97. For a video of Madame Lagarde’s discussion with Vice Chairman Fischer, see Reforming
Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Workshop on Progress and Challenges, FED.
RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/events/banking
/2015/1105-2015 [https://perma.cc/89YF-3HJY].
98. See generally Education and Industry Forum on Financial Services Culture, FED. RES. BANK
OF N.Y. (Oct. 2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/education-industry-forum [https://
perma.cc/ZN97-WTWE].
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of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association (Model Rules),
a lawyer cannot “prudently ignore the interests of the investing public in
advising . . . clients. . . . [I]n rendering advice, the lawyer must be
conscious of the client’s own duties to the investing public and the
consequences to the client of violating those duties.”99
2. When do lawyers get in the way of reform? We have observed that,
when speaking to banking audiences, this topic generates a lot of interest.
The panel discussion covered two scenarios: First, how does the increased
assertion of the attorney–client privilege affect public sector inquiries?
Second, in a private law setting, how does legal advice restrict a culture
reform agenda—for example, through limiting what is disclosed about
employee discipline?
3. Should banks require their attorneys to advise employees on nonlegal considerations? This discussion debated whether banks should
require in-house and outside counsel to advise on the social and moral
dimensions of their decisions. Both the Model Rules and the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Restatement) permit attorneys to
advise clients on the basis of non-legal factors, including the “moral” or
“social” dimensions of a decision—that is, advice that beyond what is
strictly illegal or arguably legal.100 Panelists discussed whether giving
attorneys an express mandate to raise the moral and social dimensions of
banker decisions would increase awareness of the broader consequences
of financial decisions. It was also observed that the mandate might combat
the perception among some bankers that attorneys are purely
“transaction[al] engineers.”101
4. Should Congress create a statutory self-evaluation privilege for
financial institutions? Every state offers hospitals an evidentiary privilege
against the disclosure of “mortality and morbidity” evaluations.102 The
purpose is to enable discussion of errors and root causes without fear of
99. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE LAWYER’S
ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 65–66 (2006), https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/CORPORATE
_GOVERNANCE06.pdf [https://perma.cc/98GM-7QJH].
100. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“In counseling a client, a lawyer may address
nonlegal aspects of a proposed course of conduct, including moral, reputational, economic, social,
political, and business aspects.”).
101. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 57 BUS.
LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002). Indeed, postmortem evaluations of corporate bankruptcies have criticized
lawyers who “saw their role in very narrow terms, as an implementer, not a counselor.” ERIC A.
CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 573 (4th ed. 2018); see also Final
Report of Neil Batson, In re Enron Corp., et al., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003).
102. See Jenkins v. Dekalb Cty, Ga., 242 F.R.D. 652, 660 (N.D. Ga. 2007); JEROME G. SNIDER
ET AL., CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, § 6.01, n.14 (2019).
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litigation. Two states—Delaware and Louisiana—offer a similar privilege
to banks.103 The panel and audience debated whether an assurance of
confidentiality would promote thorough and candid discussions of
mistakes and ways to avoid them in the future. A model statute follows
this essay as Exhibit A.
In addition, senior leaders of the New York Fed have given more
than twenty-five public speeches about culture in financial services.104
This number does not include participation in panel discussions at various
conferences held around the world. Our colleagues also attempt to collect
significant speeches and reports about banking culture by other official
sector leaders. This effort has produced a website dedicated to sharing
information about the culture.105
B. Publication
Some of its staff have also published a whitepaper arguing that
“cultural capital” as an intangible asset is a fair topic for supervision.106
Cultural capital was one idea included by the FCA in a March 2018
discussion paper entitled Transforming Culture in Financial Services.107
Contributors included not only supervisors and economists, but behavioral
scientists, bank CEOs and directors, business professors and ethicists, and
leaders of corporate governance non-profits. Essays in that paper covered
the elements of a “good” culture in financial services, the roles of
supervisors and regulators, and many ideas on how firms can make their
culture initiatives more effective.
The New York Fed has also contributed to several international
publications. Two that stand out are the development of the FX Global
Code and recent work by the Financial Stability Board about misconduct,
risk, and culture.
The FX Global Code (the Code) is a set of principles designed to
improve conduct by participants in the foreign exchange market.108 Staff
from across the New York Fed contributed to the effort coordinated by the
Bank for International Settlements’ Market Committee’s FX Working
Group. Adherence to the Code is voluntary, and the central banks that

103. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 940 (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:336(A) (2012).
104. See generally Governance and Culture Reform: Resource List, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/governance-and-culture-reform/archive#speeches [https://perma.cc/L4
U7-4CTH].
105. Governance and Culture Reform, supra note 104.
106. See generally CHALY ET AL., supra note 18, at 6.
107. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., TRANSFORMING CULTURE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 51 (2018).
108. See generally GLOB. FOREIGN EXCH. COMM’N, FX GLOBAL CODE: A SET OF GLOBAL
PRINCIPLES OF GOOD PRACTICE IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET (2018).
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contributed to the effort have strongly encouraged market participants to
adopt it.
Staff from the New York Fed have also participated for several years
in a Financial Stability Board project called the Working Group for
Governance Frameworks. Beginning in 2016 and led by Jeremy Rudin,
Canada’s Superintendent of Financial Institutions, the group has since
published two reports. The first was an overview of how misconduct risk
is addressed across firms and regulators.109 The report also included a
review of scientific literature about the root causes of misconduct. It
recommended three areas for further study: (i) “rolling bad apples,” (ii)
responsibility mapping, and (iii) cultural drivers and risk factors. A followup report published in 2018 addressed each area in greater detail.110
Framed as a “tool kit,” the 2018 report contained practical steps that
financial institutions and their supervisors could take to address each issue.
All of the options contained a common theme: Culture needs to be a
priority among an organization’s leaders who can bring the full resources
of an institution to bear on the problem.
Even before the Financial Stability Board’s work, New York Fed
staff had paid attention to the “rolling bad apple” phenomenon for several
years. The Financial Stability Board paper defined rolling bad apples as
“individuals who engage in misconduct but are able to obtain subsequent
employment elsewhere without disclosing their earlier misconduct to the
new employer.”111 Banks, like many employers, do not volunteer
information about their employees. Providing references creates a legal
risk. A misstatement or omission in a report could provide a basis for
employees to sue for economic injury to reputation or employment
prospects. Even where some disclosure is required—for licensed brokerdealers, for example—the “official version” of events is often heavily
negotiated and provides little insight into an employee’s actual conduct.112
This type of reference offers limited value to a future employer in
considering an applicant’s suitability.
We were aware at a high level that some areas of wholesale banking
and trading are noteworthy for the frequency with which bankers find new
employment at competing firms. For example, Thomas Hayes, the London
trader who manipulated LIBOR at UBS, the Royal Bank of Canada, and
Citi before being prosecuted for fraud, is one of the most notorious
109. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., STOCKTAKE OF EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS TO MITIGATE MISCONDUCT RISKS (2017).
110. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS TO
MITIGATE MISCONDUCT RISK: A TOOLKIT FOR FIRMS AND SUPERVISORS (2018).
111. Id. at 32.
112. See, e.g., New England Sec. Corp. v. Stone, No. 15575/11, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6082,
at *3–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 2011).
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itinerant traders to emerge from recent “reference rate” scandals.113
Indeed, the movement of bankers across firms, but within pockets of the
industry, may have facilitated the collusion seen in the LIBOR and FX
scandals. In workplaces characterized by high employee turnover,
employers come and go but relationships endure. Personal networks
facilitate future employment. When loyalty to those networks supplants
duty to an employer or customers, the risk of corruption increases.
A working paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research
provided insight into misconduct by Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA)-registered brokers and investment advisors.114
According to that paper, roughly one in thirteen registered brokers and
investment advisors—who, as a group, constitute approximately 10% of
total employment in financial services—had at least one instance of prior
misconduct on their public records. What is more, 38% of registrants with
misconduct records were repeat offenders. And, although 48% of
registrants with misconduct records left their jobs within a year of
disclosure, 44% of departed employees found work in the industry within
a year, albeit at smaller or less prestigious firms. This is consistent with
our anecdotal understanding based on LIBOR and FX investigations. The
labor market may undo some of the effects of firm discipline.
To promote more effective references and more informed hiring
decisions, several New York Fed officials have favored creating durable
records of misconduct.115 The idea, at its core, is to overcome the fact that
when bankers change firms, they are often able to leave their conduct
records behind. If there was a central database maintained by the official
sector, but accessible by private banks, prospective employers could check
whether an applicant had any record of misconduct that might raise
legitimate questions about poor behavior in the future. Poor conduct would
have consequences over a longer time horizon, and wrongdoers would

113. See David Enrich, Former Trader Tom Hayes Sentenced to 14 Years for Libor Rigging:
Conviction and Long Sentence Represent Major Victory for British Financial Authorities, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tom-hayes-convicted-of-libor-rigging-1438610483
[https://perma.cc/662M-623X]. Mr. Enrich subsequently wrote a well-reviewed book in which he
questioned the complicity of industry culture in Mr. Hayes’s conduct. See generally DAVID ENRICH,
THE SPIDER NETWORK: HOW A MATH GENIUS AND A GANG OF SCHEMING BANKERS PULLED OFF ONE
OF THE GREATEST SCAMS IN HISTORY (2017).
114. See Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22050, 2017).
115. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 109, at 38; see also William C. Dudley, President
& Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Workshop on Reforming Culture
and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture
in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches
/2014/dud141020a.html [https://perma.cc/J7CB-Y8YL]; Held, supra note 37.
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bear greater accountability for their misdeeds. We explain the idea for a
database in greater detail below.
C. Propose Solutions
Finally, the New York Fed has used publications and speeches to
propose ideas to the industry to help address persistent problems. In the
fall of 2014, Bill Dudley proposed four ideas116:
1. A standard industry survey of culture, which may create a
benchmark for measuring behavior. Most, if not all, large financial
institutions—like most if not all, large companies—conduct internal
assessments about their cultures. The word “culture” may not appear in
the titles or descriptions of those assessments, but they aim to measure
group norms and employee attitudes. That data, however, remains within
firms. Even if they were compared side-by-side, the analysis might not be
fruitful because the questions and methods vary from firm to firm.
Undertaking a standard survey in addition to proprietary assessments
would enable industry-wide comparison and, moreover, would be a sign
of the industry’s joint commitment to improving culture and conduct.
Although not attempted in the United States, the project is well
underway in the United Kingdom. The Banking Standards Board recently
published its third annual review, in which more than 72,000 employees
in the financial services sector participated.117 That report contains
aggregated and anonymized results of a standard thirty-six question
survey, broken down by key demographics. Participating firms also
receive detailed private reports, including dynamic electronic dashboards
that are tailored to the firm’s specific information requests. While firmspecific information is strictly non-public, the quality of the analysis in the
public report speaks to the value of the exercise. The lack of a similar
project in the United States is glaring and, frankly, brings into question the
industry’s commitment to improving its culture.
2. Longer deferrals of compensation, for up to ten years, and a
performance bond for senior leaders and material risk-takers. These were
non-regulatory proposals that firms might undertake voluntarily to account
for latent financial and misconduct risks in pay packages. Lengthy
deferrals would allow time for tail risks to mature and make “claw-backs”
easier to accomplish. Ten years was a conservative estimate of the length
of time it could take for tail risk to mature or for misconduct to be
uncovered. Since Dudley proposed the idea in 2014, the United Kingdom
has, by regulation, imposed a seven-year deferral on at least 40% of
116. See Dudley, supra note 115.
117. See generally BANKING STANDARDS BD., ANNUAL REVIEW 2018/2019 (2019).
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variable compensation for material risk-takers that are subject to the
Senior Managers Regime, with vesting after three years on a pro-rata
basis.118
“Performance bonds” operate like security deposits on a rental
apartment. They promote prudent decisions and behaviors by placing a
significant quantum of money at risk. Dudley’s idea was that money
deferred by bankers could be used to satisfy criminal or regulatory fines,
partially removing the burden from shareholders, or to recapitalize a firm
in a crisis. The annual amounts at stake for each employee need not be
large. Small amounts, compounded over the years, could result in a
significant resource for a firm.119 Placing funds at risk, however, could
lead to an overall increase in compensation to make up for the portion
placed into a performance bond. Firms would have to balance performance
bonds against pressures to limit the overall volume of banker
compensation.
A version of the performance bond appeared in Citi’s 2015 Proxy
Statement as a shareholder proposal.120 Executive officers would be
required to defer a portion of their compensation for at least ten years,
during which time the money could be used to satisfy fines for illegal
conduct regardless of the personal responsibility of any officer.121 Citi’s
management argued that the proposal would impede the firm’s ability to
attract and retain executives, and that the firm’s claw-back policy already
allowed the firm to cover fines and costs for illegal or imprudent
conduct.122 Ultimately, Citi’s board recommended that shareholders reject
the proposal, which was, indeed, the outcome.123
3. A database of financial sector misconduct.124 The core of this idea
is a new federal statute that would impose two legal duties on supervised
financial institutions: a duty to report misconduct when an employee
leaves the firm and a duty to check the registry before hiring. Together,
these duties aim to combat the problem of “rolling bad apples,” described
above. The statute extends the time horizon for the consequences of
misconduct by creating a record of bad behavior, hopefully creating a
personal stake in the success of corporate controls and prompting more
careful decisions. It does not, however, preclude future employment,
118. PRA RULEBOOK, supra note 85, at Remuneration § 15.17.
119. Hamid Mehran & Joseph Tracy, Deferred Cash Compensation: Enhanced Stability in the
Financial Services Industry, 22 ECON. POL’Y REV. 61, 62 (2016).
120. See generally Letter from Citigroup, Bd. of Dirs., to Stockholders (Mar. 18, 2015),
https://www.citigroup.com/citi/investor/quarterly/2015/ar15cp.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9F9-QEPK].
121. Id. at 89.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 90.
124. See Enrich, supra note 113.
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although that may very well be the appropriate result of serious
misconduct. It just makes it less likely that a future employer could plead
ignorance of prior misconduct.
The keys to the success of a misconduct database are due process
protections for employees, enforcement consequences for reporting
misinformation or using the database for improper purposes, and a safe
harbor for employers who report in good faith. We have addressed these
features publicly,125 and have included a further summary as an appendix
to this Article.
Industry representatives on the Federal Advisory Council supported
the idea for a misconduct database in 2015.126 So far, however, no bills
have been introduced in Congress.
4. A mandatory industry ban against persons convicted of a crime of
dishonesty. Under current law—Section 19 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act—a person convicted of a crime of dishonesty is prohibited
from working in a federally insured depository institution, a bank holding
company, and one or two other types of institutions.127 Employment is not
prohibited at broker-dealers, investment advisors, exchanges, or other
firms overseen by the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and other federal regulators. Section 19 might be amended
to cover any “activity that is financial in nature or incidental to a financial
activity,” a phrase borrowed from the Bank Holding Company Act.128 So,
it would no longer matter what type of financial firm a banker wants to
work for—supervised or “shadow.” If convicted of a crime of dishonesty,
future employment in finance would be prohibited. The portion of Section
19 that permits courts to lift the ban would remain.
V.
John C. Williams, who succeeded Bill Dudley as President of the
New York Fed in 2018, has argued that “good times” can feed the root
causes of misconduct in the same way that Irish retail banks and the
Commonwealth Bank of Australia experienced: “[It] can look like
125. See generally Held, supra note 37.
126. Record of Meeting: Fed. Advisory Council & Bd. of Governors, N.Y. FED. RESERVE 10
(May 8, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/fac-20150512.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT
5Z-UQV9] (“At the industry level, one significant and immediate step would be a coordinated effort
to establish a comprehensive employee database across banks that could prevent bad actors from
moving from one firm to another and allow for consistent regulatory supervision . . . . A regulatorsanctioned or -sponsored mechanism . . . with consistent and transparent standards covering various
industry sectors, could assist both regulators and the industry in monitoring and preempting recidivist
behavior.”).
127. 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2018).
128. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2018).
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everything’s coming up roses, even when an uncomfortable reality lies
beneath.”129
As we write this Article, roughly one year after John Williams added
his voice to the chorus, the good times continue. Unfortunately, so do
misconduct scandals. Recent headlines concern fraud in Malaysia’s
sovereign wealth fund130 and money laundering through the Baltic
branches of Scandinavian banks.131 Or, even more recently, we have seen
the conviction of the former head of HSBC’s foreign exchange trading
desk for lying to a bank customer about material facts in a foreign
exchange transaction.132 Even more troublingly, a similar case brought
against the head of Barclay’s foreign exchange trading desk was deemed
legally insufficient because “BS-[ing]” was so common in the foreign
exchange market that no one could have been reasonably induced to rely
on a trader’s misrepresentations.133 Clearly, misconduct and cultures that
contribute to misconduct remain an important and unresolved issue.
We previewed at the start of this Article some questions that would
benefit from academic input. In light of the background we have provided
on the work of the New York Federal Reserve and other public authorities,
we return to them with some additional explanation.
1. What are we missing about culture? How can we make a stronger
case that culture matters in financial services? Are there angles and
insights we have overlooked? Are there aspects of our work that appear
simplistic or uninformed? Are there canonical texts that would give a more
solid foundation to our work? What are the really exciting areas of
research about the root causes of behavior?
2. What else should we and our colleagues at the New York Fed do?
Do you have ideas for projects that would help academics or the industry
in their work on culture? Are there specific types of conferences that
129. John C. Williams, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Remarks at
Governance and Culture Reform Conference: Now is The Time For Banking Reform (June 28, 2018)
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/wil180618 [https://perma.cc/CS47-ZVBZ].
130. See Stefania Palma, 1MDB Explained: Timeline of Malaysia’s Financial Scandal, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fce8018c-2b4e-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8 (last
visited Nov. 10, 2019).
131. See Richard Milne & David Winter, Danske: Anatomy of a Money Laundering Scandal,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/519ad6ae-bcd8-11e8-94b2-17176fbf93f5
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
132. United States v. Johnson, 939 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2019).
133. United States v. Bogucki, No. 18-cr-00021-CRB-1, 2019 WL 1024959, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 4, 2019) (“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, there is simply
no evidence in the record that, in the context of an arms-length transaction in which the parties bluffed
and ‘BS-[ed]’ each other, operated as principals, looked out for their own interests, and understood
the other party to be ‘posturing,’ rather than providing strictly true information, someone in [the
customer’s] position could, objectively, be induced by the statements in this case to part with money
or property.”).
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would be helpful? Can we help create research opportunities? Are there
market shortcomings that would benefit from new proposals?
3. How do we know if there has been progress? In 2014, Bill Dudley
argued that an absence of new scandals would be a good start.134 That said,
the absence of a catastrophe may not be proof of competence. Are there
other indicators that would show the progress on culture? Are there ways
for the industry to rebuild and demonstrate its trustworthiness?
We welcome your input on these questions.

134. Dudley, supra note 115.
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Appendix A — Proposed Self-Evaluation Statute
(1) Peer Evaluation Program. Every supervised financial institution shall
maintain a coordinated program for the identification and prevention of
illegal, unsafe, or unsound practices (Peer Evaluation Program). Such a
program shall include at least the following:
(a) The establishment of a quality assurance committee with the
responsibility to review the services rendered by the financial
institution in order to improve the quality of financial services offered
to the public and to prevent illegal, unsafe, or unsound practices,
including violations of supervisory guidance, a code of conduct, or
industry conduct standards. Such a committee shall ensure that
information gathered pursuant to the program is utilized to review
and to revise the institution’s policies and procedures. At least one
member of the institution’s management committee must participate
in the committee;
(b) A financial services staff sanctions procedure through which a
finding of intentional or repeated misconduct (i) is included in an
annual employee evaluation and, (ii) in the case of illegal conduct, is
reported to the appropriate regulatory and criminal authorities, both
foreign and domestic;
(c) The maintenance and continuous collection of information
concerning (i) the financial institution’s experience with negative risk
and compliance outcomes and incidents injurious to the institution or
its customers and (ii) customer complaints;
(d) Education programs explaining the reviews conducted by the
quality assurance committee and other issues related to consumer
protection, fraud prevention, staff responsibility to report violations
of law, regulation, or the institution’s code of conduct, legal and
regulatory compliance, and improved communication with
customers; and
(e) Continuing education programs for financial services
professionals and the institution’s management in their areas of
specialty.
(2) Limitation on liability. Any person who, in good faith and without
malice, provides information to further the purposes of the Peer Evaluation
Program or who, in good faith and without malice, participates on the
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quality assurance committee shall not be subject to an action for civil
damages or other relief in any court or in any other proceeding as a result
of such activity. Any financial institution, or any person acting on behalf
of such financial institution who, in good faith and without malice, takes
or fails to take any action as a result of a review conducted pursuant to
subdivision one of this section, shall not be subject to an action for civil
damages or other legal or equitable relief as a result of such action or
failure to act.
(3) Confidentiality.
(a) The information required to be collected and maintained pursuant
to subdivision one of this section, and any review required pursuant
to subdivision one of this section, shall be kept confidential and shall
not be released except to state or federal banking supervisors.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, none of the
records, documentation, or committee actions or records created or
maintained pursuant to subdivision one of this section shall be subject
to discovery in any criminal or civil investigation or litigation
pending in any state or federal court, except investigations or
proceedings conducted by state or federal banking supervisors related
to compliance with this section.
(b) No person in attendance at a meeting pursuant to subdivision one
of this section shall be required to testify as to what transpired thereat.
The prohibition relating to the discovery of testimony shall not apply
to the statements made by any person in attendance at such a meeting
who is a plaintiff in an action or proceeding regarding the subject
matter of which was reviewed at such meeting.
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Appendix B — Term Sheet for a Banker Misconduct Database














The proposal will create a searchable database to collect and
share information among banks about banker misconduct.
The database will be administered by the public sector and paid
for by large financial institutions (greater than fifty billion
dollars in total consolidated assets).
A new federal statute will create two legal obligations:
o Duty to report misconduct causally linked to departure
from firm; and
o Duty to inquire after conditional offer and before work
commences.
A report to the database does not bar future employment; it
merely provides information that a prospective employer should
consider.
All federally supervised financial institutions and their
subsidiaries and all Federal Reserve Banks must participate by
reporting and accessing information. This includes:
o Bank holding companies;
o Non-bank financial companies supervised by the Board
of Governors;
o Designated financial market utilities; and
o Combined U.S. operations of a foreign banking
organization.
Roll-out to other financial firms may be considered, either on a
mandatory or opt-in basis.
Triggering event for reporting is cessation of employment—via
termination, resignation, retirement, or otherwise—for an
enumerated reason. These reasons might include:
o Violation of law, regulation, policy, or guidance;
o The subject of regulatory enforcement action or criminal
prosecution;
o Violation of an employer’s code of conduct; or
o The subject of customer complaint.
Reporting institution must provide the former employee’s name,
date of birth, title, dates of employment, and a narrative
explanation of reasonable detail to inform a reader of the nature
of the underlying conduct.
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Ongoing duty to update and amend information in a report,
especially if new facts emerge following an employee’s
departure.
Reporting obligation covers employees engaged in banking
functions and other professional positions regardless of their
level of seniority, but does not cover support staff.
Database records may expire after some period of time (five or
six years).
The statute would provide a limited safe harbor for employers
based on their reporting. Records may be expunged or amended,
but no money damages may be awarded against an employer.135
Due process protections for employees include:
o Mandatory notice to the former employee, including a
copy of the report;
o Optional fast-track, low-cost administrative hearing to
challenge the accuracy of the report;
o Absolute right to seek injunctive relief from federal
district court, regardless of whether first seeking
administrative relief (i.e., no exhaustion requirement);
o Availability of a temporary hold on report that is
challenged by a former employee;
o No limit on former employee’s right to sue for wrongful
termination or pursue any other employment claim; and
o Banking supervisors may take enforcement action
against participating employers for abuse or misuse of
the system.
Confidentiality protections for employees and employers
include:
o No public access (important trade-off for safe harbor);
o A requirement that access to the database be on a needto-know basis;
o Participating firms must adopt confidentiality
procedures to protect the information submitted to and
obtained from the database; and
o Use of database by supervised financial institutions
subject to prudential supervision.
Penalties for non-reporting or misuse of database:

135. Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3)(A) (2018).
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Enforcement against supervised institutions (mandatory
participants) available,136 and if codified in the Bank
Holding Company Act, heightened criminal and civil
sanctions.137
o Criminal obstruction statutes138 continue to apply as a
backstop against intentional misreporting to the
government.
Conflict with non-U.S. law is to be resolved on a case-by-case
basis, with participating firms obligated to make “all reasonable
efforts” to comply with statutory duties.
o
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136. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2018).
137. See 12 U.S.C. § 1847(a), (b), (d) (2018).
138. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1517 (2018).

